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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Trump Administration’s trade strategy is unorthodox to 
phrase it in the mildest terms. At no time since the modern international 
trading system began with the founding of the World Trading 
Organization (“WTO”) has the US government launched such a multi-
pronged assault on the global trading system.1 The Trump 
Administration’s approach—as I have argued elsewhere2—is, in my 
view, quite dangerous for the global trading system and contrary to the 
United States’ interests. The purpose of this Essay is to provide some 
constructive analysis on how the Trump Administration, or another 
 
* Jeffrey and Bettysue Hughes Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for 
International and Comparative Law at Duke University. The Author would like to thank Rob 
Howse and Simon Lester for their comments on the conference presentation. Sophia Duran 
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1.  Rachel Brewster & Sergio Puig, Introduction: Can International Trade Law Recover?, 
113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 38, 38-39 (2019). 
2.  Rachel Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement: Can We Go Back Again?, 113 AM. J. INT’L 
L. UNBOUND 61, 61-66 (2019); Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of 
the WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2018). 
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succeeding administration, could address the United States’ trade 
concerns with other nations more productively. 
This Essay begins by acknowledging that there are real and 
serious concerns regarding Chinese government policies, particularly 
in the areas of intellectual property and support for state-owned 
enterprises. This work addresses how the United States could achieve 
gains in Chinese trade relations without creating a threat to the broader 
global trading system. This Essay’s perspective is based on the 
recognition that the United States not only needs to be concerned about 
its trading relationships today, but relations over the next twenty to fifty 
years. The rules and structures of the current multilateral system—the 
agreements making up the WTO—are overwhelmingly in American 
interests. We largely created the WTO (along with the European 
Communities, Japan, and Canada) at the height of our relative global 
economic power in the 1990s.3 The United States would never get a 
global consensus around those same rules or procedures today. 
Maintaining the stability of that system, respect for that system, and 
compliance with that system has to be a top American economic 
priority. 
In the next twenty to fifty years, the economic power of the United 
States will be very different from what it is today. China and India each 
have four times the population of the United States: China’s 1.42 
billion population and India’s 1.37 billion population dwarf the United 
States’ population of 329 million.4 These economies are currently large 
but will soon be tremendously important exporting markets and 
importing markets. American economic prosperity depends 
significantly on keeping these countries invested in and constrained by 
the multilateral system. Our concern with maintaining the multilateral 
trade system’s rules and institutions means that we should not create 
precedents today that will come back to bite us in a decade or two. 
 
3.  For a description of the bargaining that created the WTO and the use of US economic 
power, see generally Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002). 
4.  See Population Div. of the Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, World Population Prospects: 
The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP/248, available at 
https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/379H-M3WM]; see also Conrad Hackett, Which 7 countries hold half of the 
world’s population?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2018/07/11/world-population-day/  [https://perma.cc/X2ZT-HTB4] (noting that after China and 
India, the next fie most populous countries do not have a combined population equal to India or 
China). 
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This does not mean that the United States cannot address real 
trade issues where they exist. Concern for the future certainly does not 
mean that we should be fearful to act. However, the United States needs 
to be smart and sophisticated about the trade strategies it adopts. There 
is a fair amount to be gained by trade negotiations but there is also a lot 
that the United States can lose under the present Trump Administration 
strategy. 
With the goal of being constructive, this Essay offers four 
concrete recommendations on how to improve the United States’ trade 
strategy in the near term. They are briefly listed below and then 
expanded on in the rest of the Essay: 
1. The United States should frame its trade discussions with 
China as being outside of current WTO issues. Taking the 
discussion out of current trade agreements provides for more 
negotiating freedom and preserves the integrity of the current 
multilateral framework. 
2. The United States should end its block on the appointment or 
re-appointment of WTO Appellate Body members. The United 
States is currently threatening the continued enforcement of 
multilateral trade enforcement by cutting off its supply of judges.5 
Ending this enforcement crisis would create greater support for 
broader US trade policies and restore confidence in the multilateral 
system. 
3. The United States should cease making its broad national 
security claims used to justify the current steel and aluminum 
tariffs.6 Maintaining these claims creates a precedent for a major 
loophole in trade law that other countries, particularly China, 
could use in the near future. 
 
5.  Tom Miles, Trump threats, demands spark 'existential crisis' at WTO, REUTERS (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-insight/trump-threats-demands-
spark-existential-crisis-at-wto-idUSKCN1MY12F [https://perma.cc/N78R-RNPY] (discussing 
the Trump Administration’s block on appointing any new members to the WTO Appellate 
Body); see also Jennifer A. Hillman, How to Make the Trade War Even Worse, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/opinion/trade-war-china-wto.html 
[https://perma.cc/RDQ9-GFEV] (discussing the detrimental effects of the Trump 
Administration trade policy). 
6.  Proclamation No. 9,704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation No. 9,705, 
83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018).  For an analysis of the over-breath of the national security 
claims, see Jennifer A. Hillman, Trump Tariffs Threaten National Security, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/trump-national-security-tariffs.html 
[https://perma.cc/BQ67-6FCR]. 
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4. Re-engage the Transpacific Partnership countries and their 
trade agreement. Since the United States withdrew from the 
negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement 
(“TPP”), the other member countries have concluded that 
agreement—now called the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”).7 These 
countries surround China, and their support is critical to seeing 
Chinese trade reforms through. 
Altering current American trade policy to incorporate these four 
elements would allow the United States to challenge Chinese trade 
policies while preserving the stability of the multilateral system. The 
rest of this Essay discusses these recommendations in greater detail. 
II. FRAMING US-CHINESE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
The United States and China are currently engaged in an extensive 
set of trade negotiations regarding subjects including trade sanctions 
and counter-sanctions.8 The United States currently has imposed 
US$250 billion in trade sanctions against China, which has responded 
by imposing its own US$110 billion in sanctions on US imports.9 The 
Trump Administration’s threat to further escalate trade sanctions by 
US$260 billion was placed on hold after US and Chinese leaders agreed 
to a truce in escalations at the G20 Summit in Argentina in December 
2018.10 Currently these disputes are characterized as involving WTO 
issues,11 but they could viably be framed as addressing issues outside 
of the scope of the WTO rules. 
 
7.  Ernesto Londoño & Motoko Rich, U.S. Allies Sign Sweeping Trade Deal in 
Challenge to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/world/
asia/us-trump-tpp-signed.html [https://perma.cc/RZS2-A89A] (discussing the formation of the 
CPTPP out of the countries that negotiated the TPP, minus the United States). 
8.  See Chad Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War: An Up-To-Date Guide, 
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-
policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide [https://perma.cc/JA7F-8ZEZ]. 
9.  For a full accounting of the phases of retaliation and counter-retaliation, see id. 
10.  Mark Lander, U.S. and China Call Truce in Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/world/trump-xi-g20-merkel.html [https://perma.cc/
MSP6-DVW4]. 
11.  Ana Swanson & Eileen Sullivan, Trump Aims New Threat at China as Mnuchin Warns 
of Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/us/
politics/trump-trade-policies.html [https://perma.cc/7WL9-GFKL] (discussing how the Trump 
Administration describes China as cheating on trade and claiming that China is violating WTO 
rules).  
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The dispute between the United States and China involves a 
number of issues, but one of the main drivers of the dispute is 
intellectual property protection.12 In particular, the US government 
alleges that the Chinese government requires US firms to share 
technology with Chinese firms in joint ventures as a condition of 
investing in China.13 This claimed conduct, often referred to as “forced 
technology transfers,” is a major complaint of US industries.14 
This intellectual property claim arguably falls outside of WTO 
rules because it engages an exception to China’s Accession Protocol to 
the WTO.15 That agreement, which allowed China to become a member 
of the WTO in 2001, was very broad but arguably allowed China to 
maintain some conditions on foreign investment (including joint 
ventures), subject to limitations.16 Those limitations were set out in 
Section 7(3), which states in relevant parts that “China shall ensure that 
. . . the right of importation or investment by national or subnational 
authorities, is not conditioned on: . . . performance requirements of any 
kind, such as . . . the transfer of technology, export performance or the 
conduct of research and development in China.”17 The question 
becomes whether the Chinese government’s practice of urging US 
firms to share technology with local firms is a de facto performance 
requirement or simply encouragement.18 
 
12.  Lingling Wei, U.S., China Negotiators Narrow Differences on Trade, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-negotiators-narrow-differences-on-
trade-11546959523 [https://perma.cc/6WCW-BAXE]. 
13.  Allen Rappaport, Intellectual Property to Take Center Stage as Trump and Xi Meet, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/us/politics/intellectual-
property-trump-xi.html [https://perma.cc/WHG6-M7TR]. 
14.  The major trade complaint involves these forced technology transfers but often 
discussions of intellectual property in China also involve concerns about the actual theft of 
intellectual property by Chinese state agents and the selective enforcement of intellectual 
property laws within China. For an excellent overview of these issues, see the Trade Talks 
Podcast, Trade Talks Episode 65: What Would a Trump-China Deal Look Like?, PETERSON 
INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Dec. 9, 2018), https://piie.com/experts/peterson-perspectives/trade-
talks-episode-65-what-would-trump-china-deal-look [https://perma.cc/DL8E-9MA6]; see also 
Rappaport, supra note 13. 
15.  Accession of the People’s Republic of China to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc. Wf/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. art. 7(3). 
18.  Thanks to Simon Lester for raising and discussing this issue with me. For a more 
detailed analysis of the issue, see Simon Lester, Forced Technology Transfer and the WTO, 
INT’L ECON. L. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/
forced-technology-transfer-and-the-wto.html [https://perma.cc/7NC2-ZJSU]. 
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Currently, the US government is somewhat vague about whether 
it considers this dispute to be under WTO rules or not. In internal WTO 
discussions, US representatives have generally maintained that they are 
not claiming that China is breaching WTO rules,19 but have simply 
labelled China’s actions as unfair and discriminatory.20 More 
importantly, in public discussions, the Trump Administration has not 
made an effort to mark this dispute as falling outside of the WTO limits. 
Most observers probably do not know one way or the other whether the 
United States is claiming China is violating existing global trade rules.  
However, the fact that the United States has put US$250 billion in trade 
sanctions on China probably leads most observers to believe that the 
United States considers China to be in breach of trade rules.  
As a result, the Trump Administration could gain significant 
strategic ground by explicitly and loudly claiming that this dispute falls 
outside of WTO rules and that it is a distinct issue from existing WTO 
trade law. The first advantage would be gaining negotiating freedom 
by moving the dispute out of the WTO. If the United States maintains 
that China is breaching trade rules, then the entirety of the WTO would 
have a stake in a negotiated outcome. This means that the WTO 
membership would have to approve any new WTO agreement.21 As 
any observer of the WTO’s Doha Round of trade negotiations can 
attest, it is very hard to achieve a consensus among WTO members;22 
thus, this framing would provide more negotiating latitude. 
 
19.  See id. (highlighting the US Statement at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body meeting 
on March 27, 2018). 
20.  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE REPORT, UPDATE 
CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION 22 (2018) (describing these practices 
as “unfair”). 
21.  If a US-China trade agreement provided for any deviations from existing WTO rules, 
which is likely given the wide range of topics that the current negotiations are covering, then 
the parties would have to receive a waiver from the WTO membership to not be in breach of 
the WTO agreements.  For a more detailed discussion of the procedures for receiving and 
monitoring waivers under WTO rules, see generally James Harrison, Legal and Political 
Oversight of WTO Waivers, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 411 (2008). 
22.  The WTO membership has had a notoriously difficult time achieving consensus on the 
current round of trade negotiations, the Doha Round, that began in in 2001. See Raymond 
Zhong & Peter Kenny, WTO Fails to Ratify Trade Agreement, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-pressures-india-on-wto-trade-agreement-1406820288 
[https://perma.cc/2DSS-BZHP] (discussing the most recent breakdown in Doha Round 
negotiations in 2014); Frances Robinson, WTO Shifts Meeting Goals Amid Doha Stalemate, 
WALL ST. J (Dec. 14, 2011) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702038934045770
98511856526158 [https://perma.cc/RK36-XFWJ] (discussing the stalemates that lead to another 
break down in negotiations in 2009). 
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Second, this framing would preserve the integrity of the current 
multilateral WTO system. One of the fundamental principles of the 
WTO system is the multilateral resolution of trade disputes that cover 
WTO issues.23 Under the current unilateral US approach to trade 
relations, the United States has not waited for a multilateral resolution 
of trade disputes. Specifically, the Trump Administration has imposed 
trade sanctions on China without authorization from the WTO, which 
is itself a violation of WTO rules.24 If this is a dispute over WTO issues, 
such unilateralism is very detrimental to the multilateral system: it 
creates a precedent where member appointing itself as judge, jury, and 
execution of WTO law, displacing WTO legal procedures. By framing 
this dispute as outside of the multilateral system, the United States can 
protect the stability of the WTO system while maximizing its 
bargaining leverage. 
III. ENDING THE WTO APPELLATE BODY CRISIS  
The second piece of reconstructing US trade policy would be to 
end the US block on appointing or re-appointing members of the WTO 
Appellate Body.25 This practice has caused a crisis at the WTO 
because, if it continues, the Appellate Body will not have its minimum 
number of three members to hear cases as of December 2019.26 One 
former Appellate Body member, Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, has 
described the US approach as attempting to kill the Appellate Body 
 
23.  See Brewster, The Future of the WTO, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “[t]he core of the 
WTO law is not just a system of trade rules but a commitment to refrain from retaliating against 
other WTO countries’ perceived trade law breaches until the alleged breaches have been 
adjudicated, and then retaliating only to the extent allowed by WTO arbitration”). 
24.  See Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 2. The European Communities 
have decided to request consultations with China at the WTO over the issue of technology 
transfer. While this is detrimental to the American framing of this issue as outside of the WTO, 
it is yet uncertain how far the European claim against China will proceed at the WTO. See Simon 
Lester, New EU Consultations Request on (Alleged) Chinese Forced Technology Transfer, INT’L 
ECON. L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/12/new-eu-
consultations-request-on-alleged-chinese-forced-technology-transfer.html 
[https://perma.cc/575V-XN5K]. 
25.  See Miles, supra note 5 (discussing the US practice of blocking the appointment of 
Appellate Body members and the crisis this creates for WTO adjudication). 
26. For an overview of the crisis, see Manfred Elsig, Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, 
Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth war on trade may be even more important., 
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/
09/27/trump-is-fighting-an-open-war-on-trade-his-stealth-war-on-trade-may-be-even-more-
important/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.61324096bd9b [https://perma.cc/9KJ9-Z6R3]. 
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“through asphyxiation.”27 This approach is very controversial with 
major US trade allies who view it as an attack on the stability and 
predictability of global trade law.28 As this Essay has discussed 
elsewhere, this approach to the WTO Appellate Body weakens the 
multilateral system in a manner that undermines the United States’ 
long-term interests.29 In addition, this fight is needlessly weakening 
support for the US push against Chinese trade practices by outraging 
trading allies who could provide useful support for US pressure. 
This Essay aims to highlight that the Trump Administration’s 
approach is not a useful method of “reforming” the WTO Appellate 
Body’s jurisprudence.30 At the outset, it is not clear that the Trump 
Administration is interested in reforms that would strengthen the WTO 
Appellate Body rather than simply effectively killing it. The Trump 
Administration has not presented the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
with any conditions for removing its block of Appellate Body 
members’ appointments.  This indicates that the United States is more 
interested in eliminating the ability of the WTO to rule on trade dispute 
entirely, rather than promoting a few key changes.31 
Second, most of the jurisprudential changes that the United States 
would like to see in the interpretation of anti-dumping, countervailing 
duties, and safeguards law could be negotiated with other WTO 
members without threatening the WTO Appellate Body’s continued 
 
27. See Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-Hernandez, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (May 28, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirez
farwellspeech_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UG9L-WRV3]. 
28. See Bruce Baschuk, EU Blasts Trump Trade Policy for ‘Crisis’ at WTO, Risk to 
Growth, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-17/
eu-blasts-trump-trade-policy-for-crisis-at-wto-risk-to-growth; Shawn Donnan and Benedict 
Mander, Trump Attack on WTO Sparks Backlash from Members, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3e05f236-dd72-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c. 
29. See Brewster, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, at 64-65; see also Brewster, The 
Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, supra note 2, at 1. 
30. See John Brinkley Trump’s WTO Ambassador Would Rather Fight Than Talk, FORBES 
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/10/16/trumps-wto-
ambassador-would-rather-fight-than-talk/#25dc4cf975d6 [https://perma.cc/FK3A-XMSB] 
(discussing the American ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea’s comments that the Trump 
Administration is showing leadership in reforming the WTO dispute settlement). 
31. President Trump has also repeatedly expressed his view that the WTO dispute 
settlement system is biased against the United States and that the United States always loses 
litigation before the WTO. See John Brinkley, Trump is Quietly Trying to Vandalize the WTO, 
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2017/11/27/trump-
quietly-trying-to-vandalize-the-wto/#40d4b286263f [https://perma.cc/6HUW-LPBV]. These 
statements do not help the perception of the global audience that the Trump Administration is 
dedicated to meaningful reform. 
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existence.32 The Appellate Body does not perform “constitutional 
review” in the way that US lawyers understand it, meaning that the 
Appellate Body does not have final say on the meaning of trade law.33 
Rather, the Appellate Body simply attempts to interpret existing WTO 
Agreements.34 As a result, no past Appellate Body decision would have 
precedential value (formally or informally) over a change to the text of 
a negotiated agreement by the WTO membership.35 Thus, the 
Appellate Body need not be convinced—by the threat of non-
existence—to change its jurisprudence for the trajectory of trade law to 
change in the future. This can all be accomplished by amending the text 
of the relevant agreement. While WTO negotiations are never easy, 
small changes to the language of a few agreements is much easier than 
undertaking an entirely new agreement. 
Third, this sets a terrible precedent going forward. Any nation can 
block the consensus for appointing or re-appointing an Appellate Body 
member,36 and thus other WTO members may well follow suit, 
attempting to shut down the Appellate Body whenever they have 
disagreements with the body’s jurisprudence. The end result may be a 
move to a majority voting process for WTO Appellate Body 
members,37 which would weaken the United States’ influence over the 
appointment of Appellate Body members in normal times. 
IV. NARROWING NATIONAL SECURITY CLAIMS 
Although the United States has many national security concerns, 
previous administrations have been very careful not to use national 
 
32.  See Hillman, How to Make the Trade War Even Worse, supra note 5 (noting that the 
Trump Administration’s primary complaint against the WTO Appellate Body concerns their 
decisions on unfair trade practices, which is the umbrella term for antidumping, countervailing 
duty, and safeguards rules). 
33.  For a fuller examination of the similarities and differences between American judicial 
review and Appellate Body judicial review, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the 
United States and in the WTO: Some Similarities and Differences, 
36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 595-605 (2004). 
34.  In doing so, it only compares the member countries actions to the agreed trade law.  
Carlos Vazquez refers to this as “the least controversial form” of judicial review.  See id. at 595. 
35.  See id. at 596-98 (noting that the WTO Appellate Body does not have any power to 
review substantive WTO trade law for consistency with broader constitutional rules.). 
36. The DSU agreement defines consensus existing “if no Member, present at the meeting 
of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects.” See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, n. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.  
37. See Pieter Jan Kuijper, The US Attack on the WTO Appellate Body, 45 LEGAL ISSUES 
ECON. INTEGRATION (forthcoming).  
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security as a rationale for economic protectionism. In fact, the United 
States has not used its domestic statutory authorization—so-called 
Section 232 measures—to  impose tariffs due to national security since 
1986, a decade before the creation of the WTO.38 The reason for this 
self-control is that national security presents a huge loophole for trade 
rules, large enough to destroy the trade regime. If nations make very 
broad national security claims—as the Trump Administration has done 
in the steel and aluminum cases—then other states can follow suit. 
The Trump Administration is currently considering extending 
tariffs to automobile imports under the guise of national security.39 The 
US Department of Commerce has submitted a report to President 
Trump that may provide the grounds for imposing duties on imported 
cars, including those coming from allied countries such as Germany, 
Japan, and South Korea.40 President Trump will have ninety days to act 
on this report and authorize tariffs, if the report does find imported 
automobiles to be a national security threat.41 Imposing automobile 
tariffs would be a step in the wrong direction. Instead of narrowing our 
national security claims, such a trade measure would further extend the 
precedent for applying tariffs to industries with only tenuous national 
security ties but clear political ties. This would weaken the stability of 
the multilateral trading system and harm the long-term economic 
interests of the United States. 
V. RE-ENGAGING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT 
Finally, the United States should engage with the countries that 
have formed the CPTPP.42 The Trump Administration withdrew from 
 
38. Chad P. Bown, Trump has announced massive aluminum and steel tariffs. Here are 5 
things you need to know, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/01/trump-has-announced-massive-aluminum-and-steel-tariffs-here-
are-5-things-you-need-to-know/?utm_term=.0cae76b79007 [https://perma.cc/DZ3K-ZA64]. 
39. See Richard Bravo, Trade War Heats Up as EU Vows to Retaliate on U.S. Auto Tariffs, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-18/trade-
war-heats-up-as-eu-vows-to-retaliate-on-u-s-auto-tariffs. 
40. Andrew Mayeda, Jenny Leonard, & Richard Bravo, Trump will decide if auto imports 
are a national security threat, as EU retaliation looms, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-auto-tariffs-20190218-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/RFC6-QFQS]. 
41. Id. 
42. For a discussion of the differences between the CPATPP and the TPP, see Matthew P. 
Goodman, From TPP to CPTPP, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp [https://perma.cc/8G4Q-FQDL]. 
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the TPP negotiations in 2016, but the agreement came into force 
without the United States’ participation in 2018.43 While the agreement 
dropped many US policy priorities when the United States left the 
negotiations, including intellectual property provisions and investment 
issues, the new agreement continues to promote liberalized trade 
among China’s neighbors.44 
The United States needs to engage these countries and this trade 
agreement as a means to structure the trajectory of Pacific trade 
relations. While China and the United States are the largest economies 
in the region, the engagement of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and 
Mexico will be important in shoring up any US-Chinese negotiated 
outcome. The Obama Administration explicitly viewed the TPP as a 
means to constrain China’s regional influence.45 Such a multilateral 
approach is necessary to maintain pressure on China. Even if many 
trade negotiations are bilateral, gaining multilateral support among 
Pacific countries for the outcome is critical to their successful 
implementation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 US trade policy can confront real concerns while maintaining the 
integrity of the existing multilateral system. In crafting a sophisticated 
and strategic trade policy, the United States must address trade disputes 
without threatening the stability of the trading order that the United 
States has carefully built over the last two decades. Framing US-
Chinese trade negotiations as being outside of the WTO Agreements 
can accomplish both tasks by maximizing our bargaining freedom with 
China and minimizing the appearance of unilateralism in trade 
negotiations. However, to make this strategy work, the United States 
must return to supporting the multilateral trade system by ending the 
WTO Appellate Body crisis and narrowing its national security trade 
measures. These measures would strengthen the multilateral system. 
 
43. Nicole L. Freiner, Pacific Trade Norms Established as US Producers Fear Losses, 
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 11, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/pacific-trade-norms-established-
as-us-producers-fear-losses/ [https://perma.cc/CE45-KD6G] (discussing the entry into force of 
the CPTPP in December 2018). 
44. See Goodman, supra note 42 (discussing the sidelining of American policy priorities 
in the final agreement). 
45. Kevin Granville, What is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal that Died, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-
pacific-partnership.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=8FA5AA869E406548382262A8B63C896E
&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/J6LF-NJYR]. 
1430 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:5 
Additionally, re-engaging in regional trade negotiations in the Pacific 
would further reinforce these principles in the region and help influence 
the trajectory of the United States’ evolving trade relationships there. 
